In my essay I will discuss the problems I say with the idea of 'simplicity' in public reason. It will be organised as follows:
Section I: I will give a very brief overview of the aim of political liberalism (justification), it's scope (the reasonable) and its methodological concerns (treating people as free and equal) and postulate the idea that simplicity is a feature of justification that demands that all of these are present.
Section II: I will recount simplicity as it is given in Macedo and argue that it shares a common purpose with the values of public reason in Rawls. Though Rawls's account is broader in scope I believe that simplicity is an important part of it. With this discussion in play I will then turn my attention to the difference between an argument being accessible and being acceptable, show where simplicity fits into this model, and therefore how a justification can come to be accepted.
Section III: Given two thought experiments, one in which the arguments are simplistic, and one in which they are esoteric, I will attempt to show that simplicity taken to extremes will not allow for justifcatory force, and that extremely simple arguments will not treat people as free and equal. The problem I will attempt to show is the dangers to justification of considering 'actual' audiences. This section will conclude with a comment made by Gaus regarding the idea that many actual people will not accept good reasons even in the face of overwhelming evidence.
Section IV: I will compare simplicity to the idea of intelligability (as a part of followability) in O'Neill, and argue that the conceptual space occupied by simplicity is taken over by abstraction here. I will then attempt to analyse whether abstraction can cater better to demands of justification than simplicity can.
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
Susannah's abstract
I intend to provide a critical comparison of the principles and methods of public reason in which O’Neill and Rawls seek to ground the legitimacy and authority of coercive principles of justice. In particular, I want to consider the different ways in which O’Neill and Rawls would approach the task of ensuring the public justification of (for example) controversial anti-terrorism laws.
O’Neill argues that, in order for it to count as authoritative, public reason should ‘aim to be followable by others for whom it is to count as reasoning’, irrespective of a plurality of beliefs and values. Otherwise, she suggests, the normative claims it makes will risk being seen as arbitrary or incomprehensible by those to whom they are supposed to apply. The public justification of coercive political principles, on this account, would appear to rely upon reasons that are widely (or even universally) accessible and acceptable.
Rawls, on the other hand, argues that the authority of public reason (and the legitimacy of those political principles that it seeks to endorse) is grounded in the pursuit of ends (and the use of means) that are equally accessible to and acceptable by all ‘reasonable’ people. Rawls therefore restricts the audience of public justification to those persons he deems ‘reasonable’ (where this presupposes a commitment to a basic set of liberal rights and liberties, among other things). On this account, the authority of coercive political principles lies not in their universal accessibility but in their acceptance by a predetermined audience.
At this stage, there are a number of questions I want to consider. Should coercive principles of justice be morally binding on those citizens who fail to accept their legitimacy, or are excluded from the audience of justification? Does either O’Neill or Rawls provide a satisfactory account of the public legitimacy of coercive principles of justice? Or would a conception of public reason as dependent upon a flexible continuum between wide accessibility and liberal exclusivity be more successful in establishing the authority of coercive norms?
O’Neill argues that, in order for it to count as authoritative, public reason should ‘aim to be followable by others for whom it is to count as reasoning’, irrespective of a plurality of beliefs and values. Otherwise, she suggests, the normative claims it makes will risk being seen as arbitrary or incomprehensible by those to whom they are supposed to apply. The public justification of coercive political principles, on this account, would appear to rely upon reasons that are widely (or even universally) accessible and acceptable.
Rawls, on the other hand, argues that the authority of public reason (and the legitimacy of those political principles that it seeks to endorse) is grounded in the pursuit of ends (and the use of means) that are equally accessible to and acceptable by all ‘reasonable’ people. Rawls therefore restricts the audience of public justification to those persons he deems ‘reasonable’ (where this presupposes a commitment to a basic set of liberal rights and liberties, among other things). On this account, the authority of coercive political principles lies not in their universal accessibility but in their acceptance by a predetermined audience.
At this stage, there are a number of questions I want to consider. Should coercive principles of justice be morally binding on those citizens who fail to accept their legitimacy, or are excluded from the audience of justification? Does either O’Neill or Rawls provide a satisfactory account of the public legitimacy of coercive principles of justice? Or would a conception of public reason as dependent upon a flexible continuum between wide accessibility and liberal exclusivity be more successful in establishing the authority of coercive norms?
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