Room changed to Main Quad S422!

Greetings,
Just to say, with immediate effect our room has changed: the new room is Main Quad S422. I'll meet you there today (20th March).
Cheers,
T.

Lucy's Abstract

Feminist political philosophers disagree about the role public reason can play in promoting feminist concerns. For many, the notion of public reason is inherently opposed to feminist conclusions because it prohibits the promotion of a comprehensive moral doctrine. For others, grounding feminist conclusions in public reason is a project that, while difficult, is ultimately more robust than grounding such conclusions in a particular moral doctrine.

I am interested in investigating these two points of view to determine the extent to which public reason is an effective tool for feminist political philosophy.

Within the liberal tradition, feminist philosophers of the egalitarian school have emphasised the importance of political and personal autonomy. According to egalitarian liberal feminists, the role of the state is to protect and promote the autonomy of individuals. The question of justification - why and how the state should protect/promote autonomy - is answered by egalitarian liberal feminists in two distinct ways.

The first possible answer is that autonomy is justified by particular moral theories. Susan Okin, in particular, suggests a feminist political philosophy that rests on a certain comprehensive doctrine - specifically, she argues that the state should promote a particular conception of the family in which paid and unpaid labor is shared equally between spouses. For Okin, this is the most effective way for feminist concerns to be addressed. It is, however, a doctrine not grounded in public reason - because it conflicts with many reasonable conceptions of family life.
Okin draws heavily on Rawls, who describes his own theory as a particular comprehensive doctrine.

The alternative is that feminist conclusions are grounded in public reason. Other egalitarian liberal feminists argue that autonomy is justified on grounds of public reason - that is, respect for autonomy is a shared, public value. S.A Lloyd, in particular, argues that while feminist conclusions are more difficult to reach using the 'sparse toolbox' of public reason, once reached they are more difficult to oppose. Lloyd appeals to the broad accessibility of public reason as ultimately more justifiable than any comprehensive moral doctrine, no matter how well intended.

This essay is intended to reflect the tension within liberalism between the real desire for equality and autonomy for women that is more than nominal; and the equally real desire to respect the demands of pluralism that require a broadly acceptable approach. The possibility of reconciling these two demands depends in large part on the strength of public reason.

Ellen's abstract

I want to write about the place of religion in public reason.

Liberalism attempts to justify public reason on principles such as individual autonomy, equality, accessibility, plurality and neutrality - all core values in liberal democracies – however, interesting questions arise when considering how to resolve the tension between these competing values.

The Rawlsian idea that we are two separate selves, one of which houses our individual beliefs, desires and goals and another which we call upon when participating in the public sphere, has rightfully come under scrutiny. Nevertheless it’s an idea which still has significant purchase. Our parliamentarians are criticised when they cite their religious world-view as the basis of their position on abortion, stem-cell research, gay marriage etc. Liberalism requires them to put aside deeply held moral beliefs to achieve a workable result that can be accepted by the majority.

Assuming that it is possible to set aside deeply held beliefs before engaging in the exercise of public reason, is it desirable? Do we want public debate and discourse limited to that which can be understood and accepted by all? What is the end product of that debate? Does it further just outcomes, does it provide access to the good for more citizens? Does it bring us closer to the truth? Or is it just an anaemic representation of what robust exchange should look like? Have liberal societies turned public reason into a bean counting exercise? O’Neill speaks of unconstrained discourse – how is that possible when some issues are off limits?

Religion is a useful gauge by which to measure the demands of liberalism on the person. We accept that religious belief is generally about more than interest rates. It dictates what persons strive for and how they believe life should be lived day to day. It also has a public perspective, and church groups enjoy a position, albeit uncomfortable, as lobbyists in the political landscape. Secularism and the separation of church and state have achieved only more or less limited success - depending on which nation state you look at. Liberalism itself must have a conflicted relationship with the religious tradition from which it came - which goes to the argument about liberalism promoting only liberal values. Susan Mendus believes that we face similar religious conflict today as happened in the 17^th century religious wars. She argues that Locke on toleration wants to say that religion provides the answer ie that coercion is both wrong and ineffective – whereas Liberalism wants to bracket and privatise religious belief and exclude it from the argument.

These broader themes are what I want to write about in my honours thesis. For this essay on Public Reason, I intend to concentrate on the limited and limiting nature of exclusionary style liberal debate and what that might mean in a climate of increasing pluralism.

In the first section I will present the liberal argument focusing on the implications of ideas such as reasonable people and reasonable disagreement and the tensions between neutrality and plurality.

In the second section I will put forward a critique of liberalism looking at arguments from ‘communitarian’ thinkers - eg on the problems of limited conception of the self entailed in liberal theory.

In the third section I will evaluate aspects of the two arguments using religion - from both the public and private perspective - to demonstrate what seems plausible or otherwise on both accounts.

Finally I will look briefly at what I see as the wider implications in today’s world of liberal restrictions on the terms of operation of public reason. It may be that these restrictions are necessary - in a pragmatic sense - to get things done, it may be that they are the best we can come up with, or it may be time to re-evaluate.

Dave's Abstract

In my essay, I wish to consider Gauthier’s account of Public Reason and its justification; its Hobbesian underpinnings; his notion of the “internalization” by the reasonable, of the reasons of the Sovereign; and his use of “agency” to describe the role and function of the Sovereign. This I shall attempt particularly by comparison to (but not only to) Onora O’Neill’s account of Public Reason and its justification; its Kantian underpinnings from “public practical reasoning”; and the strengths of its basis in “maxims of communication”.

The O’Neillian/Kantian justificatory principle of “followability” and its relationship with “toleration” (as the grounding of reason) will be compared to the justificatory principles (if any) of Gauthier’s “limited Sovereign” model. (Considering also Ridge’s account of the Hobbesian [and Kantian?!] regress dilemma).

Both accounts seem to struggle with issues of the “emergence versus exercise” of Public Reason. Comparative discussion of (a) the importance of emergence to, and (b) the nature of proper exercise in, seems required in both accounts. In particular, explanations about the emergence of Public Reason in both accounts, and its impact on the requirement (or not) for reflexivity, will be of interest.

Finally I wish to spend some time on the suggestion that there may be a great gulf between the positions (and it will be suggested the personalities) in the area of “motivation to reason” (and its psychological implications), an area which clearly seems essential to any of the accounts of Public Reason, I have thus far considered. It is my intention to point out what appear to be very different underlying motivational psychologies in the two accounts I make central. From this standpoint I will consider the implications, for each of the accounts, of Aristotle’s “casual man” (from Postema’s account of the need for “sincerity”). This should also lead me to a few brief comments on issues pertaining to Liberal “presumptions” which identify the “reasonable”.

Yarran's Abstract

In my essay I will attempt to view the process of legal reasoning through the lens of theories of public reason (primarily Macedo and Postema) in order to gain further understanding of both, particularly with regard to the issue of closure of debate. The structure will be as follows:

Section I – Legal Reasoning as Public Reason
In this section I will attempt to outline why legal reasoning should be thought of as public for two reasons. Firstly, the law is the method by which use of coercive force against individuals is governed (at least in a democratic society). Secondly, I will argue for the idea that law is an interpretative concept which must be seen in light of the history and goals of the society as a whole.

Section II – The characteristics of Legal Reasoning
I will here try to examine the peculiar characteristics of legal reasoning in light of theories of public reason, particularly the importance of dissensus, the role of the idea of ‘politicality’ (or legality) as a framework governing the use of conceptions of the good in public argument, and the question of arbitrariness given the role of the judge as final arbiter.

Section III – The scope of legal reasoning
Given that legal reasoning should be thought of as coming within the concept of public reason, I will consider arguments as to the scope of the law and the question of legal language; or the question of legal power – does the law really respect individuals as free and equal as it stands?

Section IV – The move to mediation
Taking questions of power into account, I will attempt to argue for a move from the adversarial system of law (plaintiff and defendant) to a system which includes mediation and discussion. I will do this by looking at Macedo’s idea of the importance of moderation in public reason.
(Additionally, I got sick last night sitting outside in the freezing Balmain wind at dinner so won't be attending class today :( )

PS.
I'm not sure whether Sections II & III should be swapped around.. any ideas? Section III as it stands is kind of questioning whether legal reasoning is truly public whereas Section II is more expository.

Anthony's Abstract

In my essay I will discuss the problems I say with the idea of 'simplicity' in public reason. It will be organised as follows:

Section I: I will give a very brief overview of the aim of political liberalism (justification), it's scope (the reasonable) and its methodological concerns (treating people as free and equal) and postulate the idea that simplicity is a feature of justification that demands that all of these are present.

Section II: I will recount simplicity as it is given in Macedo and argue that it shares a common purpose with the values of public reason in Rawls. Though Rawls's account is broader in scope I believe that simplicity is an important part of it. With this discussion in play I will then turn my attention to the difference between an argument being accessible and being acceptable, show where simplicity fits into this model, and therefore how a justification can come to be accepted.

Section III: Given two thought experiments, one in which the arguments are simplistic, and one in which they are esoteric, I will attempt to show that simplicity taken to extremes will not allow for justifcatory force, and that extremely simple arguments will not treat people as free and equal. The problem I will attempt to show is the dangers to justification of considering 'actual' audiences. This section will conclude with a comment made by Gaus regarding the idea that many actual people will not accept good reasons even in the face of overwhelming evidence.

Section IV: I will compare simplicity to the idea of intelligability (as a part of followability) in O'Neill, and argue that the conceptual space occupied by simplicity is taken over by abstraction here. I will then attempt to analyse whether abstraction can cater better to demands of justification than simplicity can.

Susannah's abstract

I intend to provide a critical comparison of the principles and methods of public reason in which O’Neill and Rawls seek to ground the legitimacy and authority of coercive principles of justice. In particular, I want to consider the different ways in which O’Neill and Rawls would approach the task of ensuring the public justification of (for example) controversial anti-terrorism laws.

O’Neill argues that, in order for it to count as authoritative, public reason should ‘aim to be followable by others for whom it is to count as reasoning’, irrespective of a plurality of beliefs and values. Otherwise, she suggests, the normative claims it makes will risk being seen as arbitrary or incomprehensible by those to whom they are supposed to apply. The public justification of coercive political principles, on this account, would appear to rely upon reasons that are widely (or even universally) accessible and acceptable.

Rawls, on the other hand, argues that the authority of public reason (and the legitimacy of those political principles that it seeks to endorse) is grounded in the pursuit of ends (and the use of means) that are equally accessible to and acceptable by all ‘reasonable’ people. Rawls therefore restricts the audience of public justification to those persons he deems ‘reasonable’ (where this presupposes a commitment to a basic set of liberal rights and liberties, among other things). On this account, the authority of coercive political principles lies not in their universal accessibility but in their acceptance by a predetermined audience.

At this stage, there are a number of questions I want to consider. Should coercive principles of justice be morally binding on those citizens who fail to accept their legitimacy, or are excluded from the audience of justification? Does either O’Neill or Rawls provide a satisfactory account of the public legitimacy of coercive principles of justice? Or would a conception of public reason as dependent upon a flexible continuum between wide accessibility and liberal exclusivity be more successful in establishing the authority of coercive norms?

Here's something to look at: last session we considered problems relating to the possible (and likely) controversiality of the conceptions that determine the criteria and the scope of public justification.
Of course this is to a large extend about the epistemological role of toleration -- seen as something that might have to be observed at the level of identifying and treating considerations as possible justifiers, or (public) reasons. Now, James Bohman, an advocate of deliberative democracy, i.e., the sort of issue we'll be looking at in class soon, writes:
"The debate about religion and the public sphere has largely focused on the wrong problem: the crucial issue in a reflexive and deliberative regime of toleration is not whether religious reasons are public or not, bu how it is that standards of public reason and toleration themselves can properly be challenged and widened with the expanding moral and political community." That's from his paper "Reflexive toleration in a deliberative democracy", in Catriona McKinnon, Dario Castiglione (eds), The culture of toleration in diverse societies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 113.
This seems to be exactly on the lines of our diagnosis. That is, even if building normative constraints, such as (potentially exclusive) threshold tests of reasonableness of sorts, into the framework of public justification is unavoidable, given that public justification aspires to be a genuine form of justification (recall here Macedo's "dual aims"), we might want those constraints to be such that they can be revised by or from within public reasoning and justification. For Bohman, this asks us to adopt a requirement of "reflexivity" -- roughly, public reasoning becomes reflexive when is subjects its own framework conceptions to the scrutiny of public reasoning. And perhaps some such requirement of "reflexivity" is what we need to reconcile public justification's justificatory aspirations with what appears to be an inevitable element of dogmatism stemming from the fact that we cannot even start to form an idea of public justification as justification without supposing that public justification is subject to some important normative constraints, such as (potentially exclusive) threshold tests of reasonableness of sorts. Or so it might seem.
Bohman's notion of public reasoning/deliberation appears to be suggested from the point of view of an attempt to overcome exactly this kind of problem (if it is a problem). Thus, if you read the paper, here are two questions that might be worth bearing in mind:
(i) Is that what Bohman outlines still something that could plausibly be claimed to be justificatory?
(ii) How, if at all, could public deliberation a la Bohman allow for reasoned, non-arbitrary closure?
(You might think of the problems of Mill's account of freedom of speech in On Liberty here: the reasons we advance in advocating the opening and continuing of debate are not necessarily consistent with the reasons we would need to appeal to in order to defend the possibility of a legitimate closure of debate. But, it would at least intuitively seem, only if it can be legitimate to close allegedly justificatory debate on whether to accept or reject a prescription can it be legitimate to act on it.)

Greetings,
This is evidently still a construction site, though I set it up now so that it can be used immediately. At present, only invitees can author or read postings; and while the first focus is on seminar related matters, I did add a (very) few friends of mine who are interested in the topic from outside the seminar.