Ellen's abstract

I want to write about the place of religion in public reason.

Liberalism attempts to justify public reason on principles such as individual autonomy, equality, accessibility, plurality and neutrality - all core values in liberal democracies – however, interesting questions arise when considering how to resolve the tension between these competing values.

The Rawlsian idea that we are two separate selves, one of which houses our individual beliefs, desires and goals and another which we call upon when participating in the public sphere, has rightfully come under scrutiny. Nevertheless it’s an idea which still has significant purchase. Our parliamentarians are criticised when they cite their religious world-view as the basis of their position on abortion, stem-cell research, gay marriage etc. Liberalism requires them to put aside deeply held moral beliefs to achieve a workable result that can be accepted by the majority.

Assuming that it is possible to set aside deeply held beliefs before engaging in the exercise of public reason, is it desirable? Do we want public debate and discourse limited to that which can be understood and accepted by all? What is the end product of that debate? Does it further just outcomes, does it provide access to the good for more citizens? Does it bring us closer to the truth? Or is it just an anaemic representation of what robust exchange should look like? Have liberal societies turned public reason into a bean counting exercise? O’Neill speaks of unconstrained discourse – how is that possible when some issues are off limits?

Religion is a useful gauge by which to measure the demands of liberalism on the person. We accept that religious belief is generally about more than interest rates. It dictates what persons strive for and how they believe life should be lived day to day. It also has a public perspective, and church groups enjoy a position, albeit uncomfortable, as lobbyists in the political landscape. Secularism and the separation of church and state have achieved only more or less limited success - depending on which nation state you look at. Liberalism itself must have a conflicted relationship with the religious tradition from which it came - which goes to the argument about liberalism promoting only liberal values. Susan Mendus believes that we face similar religious conflict today as happened in the 17^th century religious wars. She argues that Locke on toleration wants to say that religion provides the answer ie that coercion is both wrong and ineffective – whereas Liberalism wants to bracket and privatise religious belief and exclude it from the argument.

These broader themes are what I want to write about in my honours thesis. For this essay on Public Reason, I intend to concentrate on the limited and limiting nature of exclusionary style liberal debate and what that might mean in a climate of increasing pluralism.

In the first section I will present the liberal argument focusing on the implications of ideas such as reasonable people and reasonable disagreement and the tensions between neutrality and plurality.

In the second section I will put forward a critique of liberalism looking at arguments from ‘communitarian’ thinkers - eg on the problems of limited conception of the self entailed in liberal theory.

In the third section I will evaluate aspects of the two arguments using religion - from both the public and private perspective - to demonstrate what seems plausible or otherwise on both accounts.

Finally I will look briefly at what I see as the wider implications in today’s world of liberal restrictions on the terms of operation of public reason. It may be that these restrictions are necessary - in a pragmatic sense - to get things done, it may be that they are the best we can come up with, or it may be time to re-evaluate.