Dave's Abstract

In my essay, I wish to consider Gauthier’s account of Public Reason and its justification; its Hobbesian underpinnings; his notion of the “internalization” by the reasonable, of the reasons of the Sovereign; and his use of “agency” to describe the role and function of the Sovereign. This I shall attempt particularly by comparison to (but not only to) Onora O’Neill’s account of Public Reason and its justification; its Kantian underpinnings from “public practical reasoning”; and the strengths of its basis in “maxims of communication”.

The O’Neillian/Kantian justificatory principle of “followability” and its relationship with “toleration” (as the grounding of reason) will be compared to the justificatory principles (if any) of Gauthier’s “limited Sovereign” model. (Considering also Ridge’s account of the Hobbesian [and Kantian?!] regress dilemma).

Both accounts seem to struggle with issues of the “emergence versus exercise” of Public Reason. Comparative discussion of (a) the importance of emergence to, and (b) the nature of proper exercise in, seems required in both accounts. In particular, explanations about the emergence of Public Reason in both accounts, and its impact on the requirement (or not) for reflexivity, will be of interest.

Finally I wish to spend some time on the suggestion that there may be a great gulf between the positions (and it will be suggested the personalities) in the area of “motivation to reason” (and its psychological implications), an area which clearly seems essential to any of the accounts of Public Reason, I have thus far considered. It is my intention to point out what appear to be very different underlying motivational psychologies in the two accounts I make central. From this standpoint I will consider the implications, for each of the accounts, of Aristotle’s “casual man” (from Postema’s account of the need for “sincerity”). This should also lead me to a few brief comments on issues pertaining to Liberal “presumptions” which identify the “reasonable”.