Lucy's Abstract

Feminist political philosophers disagree about the role public reason can play in promoting feminist concerns. For many, the notion of public reason is inherently opposed to feminist conclusions because it prohibits the promotion of a comprehensive moral doctrine. For others, grounding feminist conclusions in public reason is a project that, while difficult, is ultimately more robust than grounding such conclusions in a particular moral doctrine.

I am interested in investigating these two points of view to determine the extent to which public reason is an effective tool for feminist political philosophy.

Within the liberal tradition, feminist philosophers of the egalitarian school have emphasised the importance of political and personal autonomy. According to egalitarian liberal feminists, the role of the state is to protect and promote the autonomy of individuals. The question of justification - why and how the state should protect/promote autonomy - is answered by egalitarian liberal feminists in two distinct ways.

The first possible answer is that autonomy is justified by particular moral theories. Susan Okin, in particular, suggests a feminist political philosophy that rests on a certain comprehensive doctrine - specifically, she argues that the state should promote a particular conception of the family in which paid and unpaid labor is shared equally between spouses. For Okin, this is the most effective way for feminist concerns to be addressed. It is, however, a doctrine not grounded in public reason - because it conflicts with many reasonable conceptions of family life.
Okin draws heavily on Rawls, who describes his own theory as a particular comprehensive doctrine.

The alternative is that feminist conclusions are grounded in public reason. Other egalitarian liberal feminists argue that autonomy is justified on grounds of public reason - that is, respect for autonomy is a shared, public value. S.A Lloyd, in particular, argues that while feminist conclusions are more difficult to reach using the 'sparse toolbox' of public reason, once reached they are more difficult to oppose. Lloyd appeals to the broad accessibility of public reason as ultimately more justifiable than any comprehensive moral doctrine, no matter how well intended.

This essay is intended to reflect the tension within liberalism between the real desire for equality and autonomy for women that is more than nominal; and the equally real desire to respect the demands of pluralism that require a broadly acceptable approach. The possibility of reconciling these two demands depends in large part on the strength of public reason.