Feminist political philosophers disagree about the role public reason can play in promoting feminist concerns. For many, the notion of public reason is inherently opposed to feminist conclusions because it prohibits the promotion of a comprehensive moral doctrine. For others, grounding feminist conclusions in public reason is a project that, while difficult, is ultimately more robust than grounding such conclusions in a particular moral doctrine.
I am interested in investigating these two points of view to determine the extent to which public reason is an effective tool for feminist political philosophy.
Within the liberal tradition, feminist philosophers of the egalitarian school have emphasised the importance of political and personal autonomy. According to egalitarian liberal feminists, the role of the state is to protect and promote the autonomy of individuals. The question of justification - why and how the state should protect/promote autonomy - is answered by egalitarian liberal feminists in two distinct ways.
The first possible answer is that autonomy is justified by particular moral theories. Susan Okin, in particular, suggests a feminist political philosophy that rests on a certain comprehensive doctrine - specifically, she argues that the state should promote a particular conception of the family in which paid and unpaid labor is shared equally between spouses. For Okin, this is the most effective way for feminist concerns to be addressed. It is, however, a doctrine not grounded in public reason - because it conflicts with many reasonable conceptions of family life.
Okin draws heavily on Rawls, who describes his own theory as a particular comprehensive doctrine.
The alternative is that feminist conclusions are grounded in public reason. Other egalitarian liberal feminists argue that autonomy is justified on grounds of public reason - that is, respect for autonomy is a shared, public value. S.A Lloyd, in particular, argues that while feminist conclusions are more difficult to reach using the 'sparse toolbox' of public reason, once reached they are more difficult to oppose. Lloyd appeals to the broad accessibility of public reason as ultimately more justifiable than any comprehensive moral doctrine, no matter how well intended.
This essay is intended to reflect the tension within liberalism between the real desire for equality and autonomy for women that is more than nominal; and the equally real desire to respect the demands of pluralism that require a broadly acceptable approach. The possibility of reconciling these two demands depends in large part on the strength of public reason.
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3 comments:
The relation between feminism and (liberal) conceptions of public reasoning and justification is certain fascinating.
As to the reference to Rawls, after his political turn Rawls refers to his earlier work, as advanced in A Theory of Justice, as a comprehensive doctrine. The Rawls texts that we have been reading are part of his attempt to avoid comprehensive arguments, and to work out a political, rather than a comprehensive moral doctrine.
Regarding the writings of e.g. Lloyd and Okin, I would suggest that you try to not go too far beyond the scope of the class reading.
In any case, the entry "Liberal Feminism" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy -- some parts of your abstract appear to draw closely on it -- certainly is an inspiring source and a useful point of first contact with the issue, though you should seek to work from the primary texts in your own right, which might ask you to cut down on the material that you work from in addition to class content.
Hi Lucy (long time no see)
Perhaps you could look at one particular feminist concern, such as equality or recognition (yes both still very broad but I know little about feminism) and see how methods or theories of public reason could apply there.
Or perhaps look at a conception of public reason itself (as a method of argument) and see how it could be altered by looking at feminist concerns (so the Benhabib article is good). Like, looking at the role of justification and what could take the place of justification (which is where the comprehensive doctrine stuff comes in I guess - the innate attractiveness? of feminism as opposed to having to justify it)
Negotiation! is the word I was looking for as a replacement? for justification. Or something like it. 'the discourse of story-telling and tradition' perhaps.
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